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Peter Murphy, The Pattern of Creation 
of the city. Why is the stranger city important? It is important because it 
tends to unleash the aural-pictorial-plastic imagination. Such creative 
imagining emerges under conditions of porous social ties. Th~ stran~er. ~ity 
is an ecology of such porous ties. It is the via media ofunsoc1al soctabthty. 
Paradoxically, strong social forms emerge where society is "weak" in the 
sense that its linguistic norms, rules and authority are feeble. Under 
conditions of weak linguistic interaction, figurative schemata, visual 
thinking, musical and plastic-haptic forms come to the fore. This occurs 
because the noise of language is reduced. Opinion, rhetoric, propositional 
judgments, verdicts, and convictions are all treated sceptically. The 
reasoning of debate, which can never escape conventional premises, is set 
aside. Logos and doxa are downplayed along with dogmatic, moralising, 
and righteous assertions. Through the graphical, schematic and pictorial 
media of the imagination, new forms (shapes and figures) emerge. 
Shape implies order - kosmos in contrast to kaos. Everybody has 
experienced the impulse to replace kaos with kosmos when we say: "Let us 
meet where there is a whiteboard. I think more clearly when I can sketch 
things out." Sense can be made out of the fog of a messy situation when we 
can sketch a solution. Just as there is individual and group sketching, there 
is also a social whiteboard. It is not language. Language is not the house of 
being. The house of being - being that pushes towards giving itself form -
is the city. In cities, more than any other social medium, human beings 
outwardly in their external environment) represent aural, visual and haptic 
forms to themselves. Cities allow considerable scope for experimenting 
with new shapes and patterns. Some experiments are idiosyncratic and 
quickly die. Most experiments repeat (with minor differences) what already 
exists. Successful forms by definition are repeated. It is notable just how 
quickly compelling forms are picked up and replicated in cities. While 
repetition is a key aspect of any form creation, it is not repetition per se that 
defines the creative city. It is emergence. Emergence stands on 
contrariness: the capability to unify what is divergent: "out of many, one." 
This is not the negative capability of social critique. It is the "musical" 
capacity to harmonise the discordant. What contrary minds do on an 
individual level, great cities do on a collective level. The city in this sense 
is the site for experiments that turn existing forms into the materials out of 
which new fonns emerge. This poietic activity turns the past into the 
future, memory into expectation, and history into that which is new and 
unexpected. Out of this compounding of time, it creates a "new order of the 
ages". 
Culture & Memory. Special Issue of Modem Greek Studres (Australia and New Zealand) 2006: 38 
Object-Oriented Aesthetics: 
The Legacy of Plato in the 
Philosophy of Art 
Eugenio Benitez 
University of Sydney 
For the products of the arts have their excellence in themselves; 
it is enough, then, that they have these [fine qualities] in some 
way when they have been made. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.4.11 05a27-29 
Aristotle thought that artistic excellence lay entirely in the objects of art. In 
this he was merely stating plainly the view already maintained by his 
predecessor, Plato. Plato himself was not so conservative, however. The 
conception of artistic excellence that preceded him was dynamic, but 
through persistent effort and argument Plato brought about a change of 
focus in aesthetics that has persisted down to the present day. I shall call 
the focus that Plato brought to art "object-oriented aesthetics" and describe 
it as follows: an aesthetics is object-oriented just in case it locates artistic 
excellence entirely in art objects, their objective properties or their 
objective relations. Plato's object-oriented aesthetics is a special case: it 
locates artistic excellence entirely in beauty, which is seen as an objective 
property instantiated in art objects. 
In this paper I will begin by exploring the context in which object-
oriented aesthetics arose. I will set object-oriented aesthetics against 
another focus which I shall call "activity-oriented aesthetics", in which the 
excellence of an artistic production lies in the artist's activity. This activity 
is merely expressed in the finished work, even when the work is 
overwhelmingly admirable. Excellent artistic activity originates and 
persists in the artist's manner, execution and style. 1 Just as there is a special 
1 A product of chance or accident can be beautiful only in an equivocal sense It has the appearance of 
something that might have been fashioned, but it is not artistically beautiful. Similarly, a chance 
arrangement of matter cannot be naturally beautiful, however wondrous it may appear. 
Eugenio Benitez, "Object-Oriented Aesthetics: The Legacy of Plato in 
the Philosophy of Art", Culture & Memory. Special Issue of 
Modern Greek Studies (Australia and New Zealand), 2006: 39-50. 
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case of object-oriented aesthetics in which objective beauty is the 
fundamental aesthetic concept, there is a special case of activity-oriented 
aesthetics in which artistic beauty/ a property of the artist's activity, 
becomes the fundamental aesthetic concept. Artistic beauty is beauty that 
radiates from the activity of an artist. It is visible directly in the activity 
itself, but it is also visible in the work through and to which it is 
transmitted. (The combination of activity and work I shall call 'artistic 
production'.) 
The concept of artistic beauty is latent in Ancient Greek usage, but it did 
not find expression in traditional Western theories of art, which tend to 
focus either on properties of the work (colour, shape, structure, organic 
form, disposition) or on the way the work affects a spectator (emotion, 
judgment, communication). This is the legacy of Plato. I will examine four 
arguments of Plato's that lead away from artistic beauty: (1) the argument 
that beauty is not the same as attractiveness, (2) the argument that beauty is 
a sort of adornment, (3) the argument that beauty is ''the appropriate", (4) 
and the argument that beauty is transcendent. I will show, in each case, 
how object-oriented aesthetics supplants activity-oriented aesthetics, and 
why it seems so appealing for aesthetic theory. Before turning to Plato, 
however, I should like to say a little more about the general idea of artistic 
beauty that he supplants; where it originates, what its focal meaning is and 
why it is important to a theory of artistic beauty. 
The practice of art that arose in Ancient Greece aimed, in its highest 
development, at the idealisation of form, whether that be in building, 
sculpture, painting, music or poetry. The Greeks used the adjective kalon, 
which is usually mistranslated in English as "beautiful", to praise art, 
virtue, and understanding. Kalon was the regular term for excellent 
accomplishment, whether that accomplishment was intellectual 
(philosophy and science), practical (ethics and politics), or productive (art 
and technology). But it had a different sense in these different contexts. In 
intellectual contexts it meant "right" or "true". Thus Socrates, in Plato's 
Hippias Major, condemns some propositions as false and praises others as 
kalon (here the correct translation of kalon would be ''true"). In practical 
contexts, kalon meant "good" or "noble". Thus, in the same dialogue by 
Plato, Hippias says it is kalon (i.e. "noble") to bury your parents. And in art 
(which the Greeks called techne), the term kalon had implications about the 
2 When I say art1st1c beauty I mean, "beauty that radiates from the activity of an artist" Artistic beauty is 
visible directly in the activity itself, but it is also visible in the work through and to which it is 
transmitted. The combination of activity and work I shall call "arttstic production". 
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~ction of the work in addition to the product itself: it tended to mean 
;~" (as in "finely made") rather than just "beaut_iful in appearance". 3 
- lt is the context of art that I am concerned w1th here (though some of 
~~say will apply to the other areas as well). Suppose that we accept the 
figgestion of the Ancient Greek language, and adopt as our hypothesis the 
r~ that any artistic production, any human making, is beautiful just in 
:~ it is an excellent accomplishment. The idea here is that the beauty of 
~alf-lies primarily in its marmer of making, rather than in the thing made or 
¥-Jie experience of spectators. I am not saying that there is nothing beautiful 
)jn:the product. The product can be aesthetically beautiful, for example, by 
:haVing a look that is naturally appealing. But an object of art can be an 
:eicellent accomplishment, and thus artistically beautiful, whether or not it 
·i;aesthetically beautiful as well. This explains how excellent works of art 
. -~ appear disturbing, confronting, even ugly (in a purely aesthetic sense) 
:ed still have artistic beauty. There are many ways that works of art can do 
. this: they may express deep and confronting truths, or they may ironically 
arid comically point out our limited human capacity to accept certain 
juxtapositions of colour and form, and so on. But to focus on this is to give 
priority to aesthetic beauty over artistic beauty. We concentrate on the 
appearance, and feel a need to explain away the confronting or ugly 
appearance, rather than to concentrate on the production and explain the 
excellence of its accomplishment. 
An object of art can be artistically beautiful, however, just in case it 
reflects the excellent activity of its production. This reflecting performed 
by a work of art is often mistaken for an aesthetic property of the work 
itself rather than something the work does. Artistic beauty lies in the way 
that the reflecting performed by a work of art allows spectators to recreate 
and experience, though never exactly, the excellence of the production. In 
this sense it is always better to be an artist than a critic, no matter how well 
the critic appreciates the accomplishment of the artist.4 But just as artistic 
beauty is not primarily located in the work of art (only reflected there), it is 
also not primarily located in the artist (though it is projected there). 
Excellent artists may (but do not always) begin with a settled and highly 
specific project that they intend to realise through their skill. They may 
refer to such projections as they work, but the making, when it is truly 
excellent, always involves discoveries, alterations, and adaptations that are 
3 Indeed, techne, which is the Ancient Greek word for 'art', focuses on the activity more than it does on 
the product. A better English translation for tee/me in most contexts would be "artistry" 
4 Often a work of contemporary art is dismissed by an unappreciative spectator with the words, "I could 
have done that". Yet it is precisely the point of"doing that" which such spectators miss; they do not, in 
most cases, see what the artist has done in the accomplishment of the work, and they do not, usually, 
engage in the making of art themselves. 
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not part of the "authentic" project. No one could ever make just exactly 
what they set out to make, since the authentic projection is only an idea.5 
There is a danger at this point of looking for artistic beauty in the life of 
the artist, in the lusty, vibrant, tumultuous experience of Van Gogh, in the 
serenity and enlightenment of Vermeer, in the pain and suffering of Frida 
Kahlo. But this is to get things backwards. Although there may be another 
kind of beauty in the life of the artist, from the point of view of artistic 
beauty, biography is also secondary. In the biography, as in the finished 
works, there is a reflection of the excellent activity that is artistic beauty. 
But this is only a reflection. Artistic beauty is not so much in the life as in 
the living of the artist. Thus, it is not primarily the artist that is artistically 
beautiful. Nor is it the work of art. Nor is it even the project or projection 
of the work. It is primarily the activity of the making that is artistically 
beautiful; it is this activity that is the excellent accomplishment. 
I think that when we conceive of artistic beauty and artistic production 
in this way, it makes sense to think of the two as essentially related. But the 
very conceiving of artistic beauty involves a distortion, as we try to hold on 
to something that by its nature is moving and living. Realising this puts us 
in a better position to understand better how and why Plato replaces the 
concept of artistic beauty with the concept of objective beauty. For only 
when beauty has been objectified can it be available for philosophical 
argument. Let us examine Plato's four arguments for an object-oriented 
aesthetics with this in mind. 
1. The Beautiful and the Attractive 
The most popular, though not the most refined, beliefs about art have 
generally treated beauty and attractiveness as the same thing. In most cases, 
when ordinary people commend a work of art as beautiful, it is because 
they find it directly pleasing, delightful, engaging, enthusing, or 
aesthetically attractive. Productions that are aesthetically unattractive 
(those that are horrifying, devastating, depressing, or repulsing) tend to be 
recommended only when they are "important" or "courageous". The term 
'beautiful' is less often used of them. But even here the important message 
or the courageous truth of the work is artistically attractive to us, even 
s This importance of not locating artistic beauty in a projection is admirably expressed by Heraclit~s 
when he says, ''the most beautiful cosmos is like sweepings aimlessly piled up" (fragment ~24). W1t!t 
characteristic irony, Heraclitus ridicules the reigning philosophical view ofh1s day, accordmg to wh1c~ 
the universe is a kosmos, that is to say, an "ornament", purified and objectified, realised through time m 
the inexorable working-out of nature. For him, the greatest beauty is more visible in the sweepmgs.ofthe 
work-shop, the indications of attemptings (all at once successful and unsuccessful) at the nexus of 1dea 
and reality 
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though the work is aesthetically unattractive, and one feels tom as to 
whether or not beauty is involved6 Even when a work appears both 
aesthetically and artistically unattractive, people sometimes apply the old 
saying "beauty is in the eye of the beholder" in a consoling way. Though 
said of a work that he doesn't find at all attractive or beautiful himself, the 
spectator grants that the work must seem attractive and beautiful to 
someone, and to that small extent upholds the view that in art attractiveness 
and beauty go hand in hand. 
Plato cautioned against an uncritical association of beauty with 
attractiveness. At one level he accepted the connection. He thought that 
absolute beauty was truly attractive, indeed for him absolute beauty was 
perhaps the only thing that was (truly) attractive. But at another level, Plato 
thought, the work of artists presented a kind of false image of beauty, 
which he thought was falsely attractive. He criticised the artists of his day 
for being imitators7 rather than creators of beauty, and the way in which he 
thought their "imitations" were misleading was by taking as their model an 
imitation of beauty rather than beauty itself. For him, real art must set its 
sights on real beauty. But rather than set their sights on real beauty •. a:t~sts, 
Plato thought, looked to something else, namely pleasure. Plato cntlctsed 
the artists of his day for making their products merely gratifying and 
pleasing to people, and in so doing falsely attracting them .. Thus, ar:istic 
activity was not, in his view, really excellent, nor could artists be said to 
produce things excell~ntly. . . . . . . 
There is a lot that ts wrong wtth Plato's cntlcism of art1sts, but there 1s 
something important in his view that beauty and attractiveness should be 
distinguished. Whereas everything beautiful is attractive, there is more to 
beauty than attractiveness. I would like to support Plato's distinction 
between the beautiful and the attractive by appealing to two connections in 
which it appears to hold. The first is in connection with euphemism. In the 
Republic, Plato ridicules the way that lovers euphemise the appearance of 
the beloved: 
One because his nose is uptilted, you will praise as piquant, 
the beak of another you will pronounce right royal, the 
intermediate type you say strikes the harmonious mean, the 
6 This is the source of one kind of artistic ambivalence: the mixed feeling of artistic attraction and 
aesthetic repulsion. This ambivalence can be a source of great excellence in art Another, less 
praiseworthy kind of ambivalence in art is typically produced by "Shock-Art", art that is neither 
important nor courageous, but which provokes morbid curiosity or shameful intere~t.. . 
7 All art, of course, rs imitative whenever it depicts, portrays, or represents some ong1.nal. obJect. Whether 
or not all art does this is an interesting question: even abstract, conceptual, or express10mst art may be 
said to portray/depict/represent a form, concept or emotion. But I am not now interested in whether or not 
all art is imitative in this way, since surely this is not in itself a vicious form of imitation. 
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swarthy are of manly aspect, the white are children of gods 
divinely fair, and as for 'honey-hued', do you suppose the 
very word is anything but the euphemistic invention of 
some lover who can feel no distaste for sallowness ... 
(Republic V.474d-e)8 
To euphemise is to describe something that is not really beautiful in a way 
that nevertheless expresses how very attractive that thing appears.9 Yet 
when these same lovers have had their fill, and move on to others, their 
descriptions of the formerly loved ones become more sour: the first was 
"pig-nosed", the other "had a beak like a crow", the swarthy one was "a 
real brute", the white one "anaemic", and the honey-hued "jaundiced", and 
so on.10 The phenomenon of euphemism and its detection shows that there 
are cases in which something that attracts us appears beautiful though it is 
not. 
The second source of support for Plato's distinction comes from the 
context of judgment. There is a story told by Xenophon that one day a 
courtesan by the name of Theodote came to Athens. Some friends told 
Socrates that she was in town and that many painters had gone to paint her 
portrait. "She is very beautiful," they said. "Let's go, then," replied 
Socrates, "for beauty must be seen, not just learned of' (Memorabilia 
111.11 ). 11 Now there is an intriguing feature of this response that has shown 
up in many theories of aesthetics, including Kant's. And it is that when a 
friend recommends a work of art as beautiful, we generally don't take that 
as claiming that the work is merely attractive to them. We do not dispute 
that it is attractive to them, but nor do we take it for granted that the work is 
beautiful. Instead we take the claim that it is beautiful as a claim against us 
and so we must go and see the work for ourselves. So long as the judgment 
is in suspense, it seems reasonable to suppose that each person believes 
there is more to beauty than attractiveness.12 It is interesting to consider 
8 Plato, Republic, translated by Paul Shorey in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (eds), Plato. Collected 
Dialogues (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). Unless otherwise noted all translations of Plato 
in this paper are taken from Hamilton and Cairns. 
9 A lover who euphemises in this way might even observe that he is attracted to non-beautiful features. 
10 These kinds of descriptions, sometimes called "sour grapes", might in some cases betray a residual 
attraction the lover has, despite his now explicit recognition of the non-beautiful features. 
11 Xenopohon, Memorabilia, translated by B.C. Marchant (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1923). 
12 When you see the work things become more complicated, because there are many possibilities: (a) you 
find the work attractive, judge it beautiful and think that this adds confirmation to your friend's view, (b) 
you fmd the work attraqtive, judg<l it beautiful, but don't think this adds any confirmation to your friend's 
view, (c) you find the work attractive but don't think it is really beautiful, (d) you find the work 
unattractive but think it is really beautiful, (e) you find the work unattractive, and you don't think it is 
beautiful, but you don't believe this tlisconfirms your friend's view, or (f) you find the work unattractive, 
you don't think it is beautiful, and you think this d1sconjirms your friend's view. 
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that when friends disagree about judgments on such matters, the 
disagreements are often sharp, deep, and protracted. 
Thus, I think that there is a distinction to be upheld between beauty and 
attractiveness. And I think Plato was right that the subjective affections of 
the spectators are logically and materially independent of the quality of the 
art. The spectators' affections might reflect the artist's excellent 
accomplishment. But they may be entirely unrelated. Plato emphasised 
this: a person cannot misjudge whether an appearance is attractive to him, 
but he can misjudge whether an appearance is excellent. Nevertheless, I 
think that Plato drew the wrong lesson. For he saw the distinction between 
the beautiful and the attractive as an opportunity to reject everything that is 
subjective in art. But artistic beauty does have a fundamentally subjective 
element, since it is the unique, excellent activity of a particular subject, 
whom we call the artist. The excellence is actually generated in the activity 
of the artist, and it would be more correct to say that we get our ideas of 
artistic excellence from this, rather than that there are objective, external 
standards of excellence that we apply to it. That is not to say that 
excellence isn't something real, or that excellent activity can't be 
distinguished from inept activity. But it is to say that we only ever have 
guides to excellence in objects that have been realised. The realising of 
excellence in artistic production is always original, creative and 
b. . 13 su ~ecttve. 
When Plato dismissed the association between attractiveness and artistic 
beauty, he also dismissed the subjective element in art. He sought objective 
beauty first in simple properties of a work, then in objective relations, and 
finally in a mysterious absolute object that he called ''the beautiful itself'. 
The next three theories of beauty in art that I want to consider all stem from 
Plato's attempts to find beauty in something objective. 
2. Beauty as Adornment 
The first such theory I want to consider attempts to define beauty in terms 
of something that causes a thing to be beautiful.14 This idea of looking for 
the cause of beauty in an artistic production makes an advance on looking 
to the subjective reactions of spectators, since it can direct us to the artist 
13 Excellent accomplishment is thus, to a certain extent, also private. No one shares the exact subjective 
liBJate of the artist in the accomplishing of his art. I imagined this privacy in a fictional character I called 
''the internal poet", a poet who composes real and excellent poems, but only in her mind. For an 
interesting story that imagines someone who completely overcomes the privacy of the artist, see Jorge 
"Ciiis Borges' "Pierre Menard: Author of the Quixote" in his collection Labyrinths.) 
14 For the discussion of this theory in Plato, see the H1ppias Major. 
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and the making of art. 15 But in his passion for the objective, Plato thought 
of the cause too concretely, and so missed the chance of seeing it in 
excellent activity. At first he considered that the cause of beauty might be 
some substance that could be added to things to beautifY them, or separated 
from things, making them less beautiful.16 Big golden frames around 
paintings, for example, and rich decorations encrusted with sparkling 
jewels. This is the sort of thing Plato considered: beauty might be gold, or 
silver, or some other substance. Even in his more careful considerations, 
Plato allowed only the slightest abstraction. Perhaps, he thought, beauty 
was to be found not in a material substance, but in what we might call a 
simple property: a bright solid colour, or a geometric shape.17 Yet Plato 
still thought of these simple properties in the manner of substances, as 
"things" that could be added to a work to make it beautiful, as one adds an 
ingredient to a recipe to make it taste good. On this view, then, beauty is 
something like an adornment. 
There are all sorts of problems with this view. But there are two 
especially interesting ones. The first is that when beauty is conceived of as 
being a substance or property, then the beauty of a work lies entirely in the 
beautifYing substance or property. Thus, an artistic production will be 
uselessly beautiful: baroque, ornamental, floral designs on silverware, for 
example. 18 Consider a tattoo on a worker's right arm: to say the arm is 
caused to be beautiful by the addition of the tattoo completely misses the 
point. The useful arm is beautiful, and also the useless tattoo, but in 
different ways. To miss the point about the usefulness of beauty is to miss 
one of its most essential features. Artistic beauty always shows us a way of 
doing things excellently. It inspires us to do things excellently. But an 
adornment does nothing. 
Secondly, we should take note of the relation between the so-called 
beautifYing property and the material. We should notice that where 
adornments interfere with, compete with, or obscure the material, they 
seem to lose their beauty. We may find that what is simple and unadorned 
is simply beautiful. Or we may find that there are things which any attempt 
to beautifY is ridiculous. Again this problem points us towards the process 
and accomplishment of art rather than the material or properties of the 
object. For it is in the making that the properties and material are 
transformed, and blended appropriately, excellently, into a work of art. 
"But that is not to say that looking to the subjective reactions of the spectators might not do the same 
thing, if we look at them in the right sort of way, viz. as recreations of the artist's making. 
16 Strangely, he also insisted that there could be at most one beautiful substance. 
17 For more discussion of this view, see the Ph1lebus. 
18 This is, I think, Kant's theory in the Crztique of Judgment, Part I, sections 6-8. It is a theory of aesthetic 
beauty, not a theory of artistic beauty. 
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::\\Jhat causes an artistic production to be beautiful is not some inert 
fOOjective property, but the excellent activity of the artist. Through the 
;'jrtist's way, even things that have properties which have never seemed 
~ttractive before may become so. It is that way which causes a work to be 
iteautiful. 
(j, Beauty and "The Appropriate" 
Out of the failure of the adornment theory comes the idea that perhaps 
--beauty is ''the appropriate". If we knew, or had a knack for making things 
"fit" the appropriate context, we would always produce beautifully. Some 
people know what clothes "suit the occasion", and they look beautiful. A 
good musician knows what phrasings "fit" the piece, and the music is 
beautiful. A good cook has a knack for the appropriate spices. A good 
painter for the appropriate colours. A good architect for the appropriate 
scale. And so on. When a creation fits, or "works" in its context, we 
-_ applaud it as beautiful. This sense of appropriateness does some justice to 
the idea that beauty is excellent activity. In particular, it focuses, at least in 
-part, on the excellence involved in production, and not just on the 
_excellence of the product or content. 
Notice that the term "appropriate", when described this way, has a 
strongly subjective element. It is the artist's sense of appropriateness that 
makes beauty. We do not see beforehand what will fit most excellently, 
otherwise we would be the artists. And the reason we don't see beforehand 
is because the excellently appropriate creation is unique and never yet 
made. Plato was very interested in the relation between beauty and the 
appropriate/9 but in his attempt to make even appropriateness into 
something objective, he turned away from the context of excellent activity, 
to the ideas of decorum and composition. The objective conceptions of 
appropriateness he arrived at were different in each case, so I will discuss 
them separately, starting with the idea of decorum. 
One way of making a conception of "the appropriate" objective is to 
associate it with the idea of decorum. Then conventions will determine 
what is appropriate, and we will be able to make tolerably clear judgments 
about the divide between appropriate and inappropriate, beautiful and ugly. 
We can hardly deny that socially and politically, decorum is a standard that 
has great influence over art; it plays a significant role in what goes in 
public galleries, what is performed by major theatre companies, what is 
constructed inside municipal boundaries, what is printed by major presses 
and so on. And yet there are few of us who feel satisfied that art is simply a 
19 See the H1ppias Major 
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matter of decorum. Indeed, very original and creative artwork tends to be 
out of step with convention. And yet, when excellent, these productions 
"work" to create new attitudes and new conventions. Excellent 
accomplishments may be more or less conservative; they may pay respect 
to conventions, but to the extent that they are excellent, they exceed 
conventional standards and attitudes. 
But there is a greater difficulty with the standard of decorum, namely 
that it is a standard externally applied. We should like to think that artistic 
productions have something about them that makes them wonderful, 
beautiful, gorgeous; not that it is just something about our conventions or 
our society. In other words, we look for the ground of their appeal. But we 
cannot return to looking for that ground in a beautifying material or 
property. Plato ingeniously discovered a different way of defming the 
appropriate, one which appeals to intrinsic features only, but not to any 
beautifying element. Why not take organic form as the model for the 
appropriate? A production is beautiful in this sense when its parts stand in 
an appropriate relation to the whole, when they are in a special kind of 
equilibrium. On this view it does not matter if a community finds a 
particular work to be indecorous; it may still be beautiful in itself. In many 
dialogues Plato appealed to this idea. In the Republic, for example, he 
writes: 
It is as if we were coloring a statue and someone 
approached and censured us, saying that we did not apply 
the most beautiful pigments to the most beautiful parts of 
the image, since the eyes, which are the most beautiful part, 
have not been painted with purple, but with black. We 
should think it a reasonable justification to reply, "Don't 
expect us, quaint friend, to paint the eyes so fine that they 
will not be like eyes at all, nor the other parts, but observe 
whether by assigning what is proper to each we render the 
whole beautiful." (IV.420c) 
And in the Phaedrus: 
.. . any writing ought to be constructed like a living creature, 
with its own body, as it were; it must not lack either head or 
feet; it must have a middle and extremities so composed as 
to suit each other and the whole work. (264c) 
These examples reveal Plato's interest in the idea of beauty as organic 
form, but they also indicate how underdeveloped his conception of organic 
form was. It would have been wonderful if he had followed through with 
the idea that artistic beauty is a living, changing, active thing, to be found 
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creative processes of art, and reflected in its outcomes. But Plato's 
- ;Seems to amount only to stating that beauty is an internal relation of 
· ateness of the parts of a production to each other and to the whole. 
- sn't specify what the relation is, and it misses the most promising part 
e idea, namely that the equilibrium of living things is always 
ioping.Z0 Moreover, it seems that Plato's way of thinking about 
' · c form collapses back into his view that art is merely imitation. A 
tiful speech cannot just have a harmonious composition, it must be an 
~te imi~ation of some true state of affai~s. A beautiful, p~inting must 
~resent thmgs as they actually are. In this way, Plato s tdea of the 
~~opriate makes art necessarily uncreative and unoriginal. 
a. Transcendental Beauty 
Ii.'he line of reasoning we have been following seeks an objective ground 
for the predicate "beautiful" in what is the case. On this view, any object, 
acti~n, thought or proposition will be beautiful just in case it is true to what 
is. Plato accepted this identification of Beauty with Truth as 
Transcendental. It is difficult to state precisely what this means. I think it 
helps to say that it requires a total reconfiguration of attitude toward the 
beautiful. In the Symposium, Plato contrasted what falls within "beauty's 
wide horizon" (210d), namely every familiar beautiful thing, from beautiful 
people to beautiful theorems, with something else, which 
in the first place is everlasting, not growing and decaying, 
or waxing and waning; secondly, not fair in one point of 
view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or 
at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at 
another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in 
the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the 
bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or 
existing in any other being, as for example, in an animal, or 
in heaven or in earth, or in any other place; but beauty 
absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting. (2lla) . 
It is here that Plato's attempt to objectify beauty reaches its final, empty 
conclusion. For there is no object that is always beautiful, just by itself. 
Artistic beauty is temporal and active: it is located in the making and in the 
20 If he had thought about this, perhaps he would have considered the appropriateness of art to he in the 
process of production, where the harmony of the resultant work is but a reflection of the appropnateness 
of that process. 
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recreational experiencing of a work by the spectator. 21 Works of art provide 
a temporary stability of experience, but they are not the surrogates of 
something that could ever provide a permanent stability, they are 
surrogates of a subjective experience, that of the artist. Works of art are 
human, and temporal; they are excellent accomplishments, but just because 
they are human accomplishments they are imperfect, mundane, and 
transient. They could not otherwise be beautiful. 
Conclusion 
I began by saying that Aristotle simply restated Plato's views about works 
of art. It is instructive to note the context in which the restatement is made. 
For Plato also held an object-oriented ethics (which must be the subject of 
another paper). In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle departs from Plato in 
taking ethics to be about activity, and in the second book he contrasts ethics 
with art in order to emphasise this departure. For Aristotle, ethical 
excellence is an activity, a kind of living, rather than a static feature of an 
ethical object (such as "justice itself', and so on). An ethical action doesn't 
have its excellence in itself. We have to look at the agent, specifically to 
whether his performance stems from an excellent "decisional state", that is, 
an active habit to decide and live in excellent ways. That Aristotle does not 
part from Plato in aesthetics in a way similar to his departure in ethics is an 
indication of the hold that Plato's object-oriented aesthetics was to have 
over the subsequent history of art theory. 
We considered a contrasting view of aesthetics that lay dormant in the 
Ancient Greek word for beauty, namely the view that beauty is closely 
associated with excellent activity. Ironically, we saw that although this idea 
holds promise for a theory of artistic beauty, the Western theories ofbeauty 
that sprang from Ancient Greece, through the philosophy of Plato, 
consistently avoided opportunities to promote this idea. Had the view of 
artistic beauty as excellent accomplishment been adopted in Western 
aesthetics, we might then have seen much more attention to the way of art, 
and the way of life, in creating beauty. 
21 In this sense, "spectator" is a very bad word, smce it suggests a passive onlooker, when in fact, 
whenever he has an experience of art the spectator is actively recreating the excellent accomplishment of 
the artist. Such recreation may be very crude and inexact, or the actual accomplishment may not be very 
excellent, so the experience of the spectator might seem dull, but only when there is no recreation at all, 
only when he IS ''just looking" can we say that the spectator is passive. And in such cases, the experience 
is not of art but of a mere thing. 
Culture & Memory. Special Issue of Modern Greek Studtes (Australia and New Zealand) 2006: 50 
-_, ~mory of the Future: 
-- e Foresight Experience of 
~Greece 2021' 
-· 
; J; Preliminary remarks 
Demosthenes Agrafiotis 
University of Athens 
:J.:s is indicated in the title here, I am not coming from current Greece, but 
:-.ftom 'Greece 2021', that is to say, the Greece of the 21"1 century and two 
1lundred years after the Greek revolution against the Ottoman occupation. I 
'am not only a traveller of space but also a traveller of future time. In this 
-;~irit my discourse claims its inspiration from both utopia and uchronia. 
· In accordance with the title the conference: Culture and Memory in 
ihe Greek World, and the title of this essay, the first question one has to 
formulate could be the following: why, in this period of the historical 
· trajectory of our humanity, do we ask questions about memory? Some 
. ·hypotheses-apories may be elaborated: 
• The production of computer memory is more and more powerful and 
extensive. But as communication technologies have destroyed 
"intense communication" or at least, insofar as a deficit of 
communication has been created because of ICTs (Information and 
Communication Technologies), have we destroyed the "real", 
"authentic", "genuine" memory? Or is it too late to discuss the 
question of"memory"?1 
• Brain research has uncovered many secrets of cognitive functions 
and some aspects of memory are under systematic scientific 
investigation. It is hoped that mental processes and the mechanism of 
"memory" will be elucidated - will they be transparent as a result?2 
1 M. Auge, Pour une anthropologie des mondes contemporames (Paris: Aubier, 1994). 
2 Connecting Brains and Society - The present and fUture of brain science: what is possible, what is 
desirable? Synthesis and Proceedings of European Workshop, 22 and 23 Apri12004, Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands (Amsterdam: Rathenau Instituut, King Baudouin Foundation, 2005). 
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